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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
In the Matter of the Estate of WILDA 
GAIL SWAN, deceased, THEO SWAN 
HENDEE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY, 
Executor of the Last Will and Testament 
of WILDA GAIL SWAN, deceased; 
GRANT MACFARLANE; DANIEL 
KOSTOPULOS and ADA BRIDGE, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
300 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate of WILDA ' 
GAIL SWAN, deceased, THEO SWAN 
HENDEE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
W ALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY, 
Executor of the Last Will and Testament 
of WILDA GAIL SWAN, deceased; 
GRANT MACFARLANE; DANIEL 
KOS-TOPULOS and ADA BRIDGE, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 
8216 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
By its affirmance of the trial court's judgment in 
this case this court has aligned itself with substantially 
all of the courts of last resort in the United States which 
have dealt with similar cases. Our research revealed no 
case, and appellants cited no case, in which it was held 
that facts similar to those here involved were insufficient 
to sustain a judgment setting aside a will for fraud and 
undue influence. 
In their petition for rehearing appellants greatly 
labor the contention that because this court, in its de-
cision, announced the rule that the presumption of fraud 
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and undue influence arising from the basic facts in evi-
dence can be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence 
they are entitled to a new trial. Their contention is met 
and completely overcome by the language of the opinion 
itself. 
After a full discussion of the presumption involved, 
together with the nature and effect of the basic facts 
which gave rise to the presumption, this court announced 
the rule which, in its judgment, should apply. It did so 
in the following language: 
((After careful study and consideration we 
conclude that this presumption shifts the burden 
onto the confidential adviser of persuading or 
convincing the fact finder· by a preponderance of 
the evidence that no fraud or undue influence was 
exerted, or in other words, he has the burden of 
convincing the fact finder from the evidence that 
it is more probable that he acted perfectly fair 
with his confidant; that he made complete dis-
closure of all material information available and 
took no unfair advantage of his superior position 
than that he exerted fraud or undue influence to 
obtain the benefits in question." 
Following such announcement this court said: 
rrunder such a rule we must affirm the trial 
court's findings, for clearly findings that the evi-
dence failed to convince by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that no fraud or undue influence 
induced these legacies, or that the existence of 
such inducenzent was more improbable than it was 
probable was not unreasonable in view of all of 
the evidence." (emphasis ours) 
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The foregoing is a clear decision that, measured by 
the rule of upreponderance of the evidence" as distin-
guished from the uclear and convincing rule," the evi-
dence was ample to support the trial court's :findings and 
that they must be affirmed. 
With Pilcher's Estate, 114 Utah 72, 197 P. (2d) 143, 
and Jardine v. Archibald, 3 Utah (2d) 88, 279 P. (2d) 
454, as guides it was quite natural and altogether proper 
for counsel for appellee to rely upon those cases. But it 
will be noted that neither in his long memorandum 
decision nor in his findings and conclusions did the trial 
court ever mention the measure of proof he was applying. 
He made detailed findings of the basic facts which gave 
rise to the presumption, but he never even mentioned the 
presumption itself. Substantially all of such basic facts 
in the case came into the record upon examination of 
appellants. They cannot, as held by this court, be brushed 
aside, and they are ample to support the judgment. 
The only issues raised for consideration upon this 
appeal were those specified by appellants in their original 
brief on appeal. Their ((Statement of Points" is quoted: 
((Point I. The evidence is insufficient to sup-
port the findings and conclusions of the trial court 
that Gail Swan lacked testamentary capacity at 
the times she executed the will and codicils. 
((Point II. The evidence is insufficient to sup-
port the findings and conclusions of the trial court 
that Gail Swan was under the force of undue 
influence at the times she executed the will and 
codicils." 
Appellants' ((Statement of Points" constituted their 
assignments of error, and they are significant at this time 
because of what they do not embrace. 
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No point was ever made, and no argument was ever 
made, that the trial judge erroneously failed to apply the 
upreponderance of evidence" rule. What appellants did 
argue was that they had made a prima facie case 
which destroyed the presumption as well as the effect of 
the basic facts which gave rise to the presumption. That 
argument was clearly rejected by this court. 
No point was ever made by appellants that there 
was any error in the receipt or exclusion of evidence. 
A point should not be raised for the first time upon a 
petition for rehearing, and yet appellants now complain 
for the first time about reference during the trial to the 
Becker case. And such complaint is in the face of the 
fact that Macfarlane admitted upon his examination 
without any objection whatsoever from counsel that he 
had drawn Becker's will; that he was a beneficiary in 
the will; and that a will contest had been :filed. (Report-
er's Transcript 132) 
The trial court in his memorandum opinion and his 
extensive :findings of fact set forth in great detail all of 
the facts which led him to his decision, and nowhere 
did he ever mention the Becker case. 
Rule 76,(e) (1) Utah Rules Civil Procedure is based 
in part upon 104-41-26 of the 1943 Code. That section 
has been construed by this court. In Dahlquist v. D. & 
R. G., 174 Pac. 833, 52 Utah 438, at page 469, the court 
said: 
uPropositions 1 and 2, above stated, cannot 
be considered on this application. They are new 
points entirely, now brought to our attention for 
the first time notwithstanding they were just as 
available at the hearing on appeal, and, if relied 
on, should have been presented at that time. In 
4 C.J. 627, 628, the rule is stated thus: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
(( (A hearing will not be granted on the ground 
that petitioner has failed to argue an important 
point on the hearing. All points relied upon in 
support of the case must be presented by the briefs 
and arguments on appeal, and the practice of 
reserving certain points to be argued subsequently, 
in the event of an adverse decision, is condemned 
by the courts.' " 
See also, Harrison v. Harker, 44 Utah 541, 142 Pac. 
716, and Garner v. Thompson, 75 P. (2d) 168, 95 Utah 
295, 298, 299. 
Appellants seem to contend that because this court 
held the evidence was insufficient to support a finding 
of lack of testamentary capacity, the finding of fraud 
and undue influence must also fail. This court gave full 
consideration to that aspect of the case in arriving at its 
final conclusion. The point should be held to have no 
merit. 
We have read all of the cases cited by appellants in 
their last brief. One half of them were cited by either 
appellants or respondents in their original briefs and were 
considered by the court. None of the others furnishes 
any justification for a rehearing in this case. 
The decision of this court was announced after many 
months of deliberation. It reflects an objective and most 
temperate approach. It should not be disturbed. 
Wherefore respondent prays that appellants' petition 
for rehearing be denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
PAUL H. RAY, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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